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There is a consensus in economics that a significant gender gap in competitiveness exists, which 
contributes to substantial gender difference in economic outcomes. Our study uses a controlled 
online experiment to explore a potential explanatory variable for gender gaps in tournament 
entry, namely, the gender difference in attribution of feedback. We find that, upon receiving 
negative feedback, women attribute it to lack of ability, regardless of what self-evaluation they 
hold initially. On the other hand, men blame bad luck for negative feedback that challenges their 
positive self-evaluation, and only blame their own ability if their self-evaluation was pessimistic 
in the first place. We also find that feedback eliminates the gender difference in tournament 
entry, confirming previous work. The elimination of the gap is mostly attributable to the fact that 
low-performing men are less likely to enter competition upon receiving feedback. Despite a 
substantial difference in attribution patterns, we cannot conclude, with our current data, whether 
feedback attribution is a major explanatory variable for the gender gap in competitiveness.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Previous research in economics indicates that there is a substantial gender gap in 
economic outcomes. For instance, Bertrand and Hallock (2001) show that, in a sample of US 
companies, women account for just 2.5% of top five executive positions. A simple comparison 
between annual wages of full-time working women and men shows that women earn about 79% 
of what men earn (Blau and Kahn, 2016).  
 The potential underlying explanations for the gender gap can be sorted into two broad 
categories. First, women might be discriminated against directly or differentially treated by 
employers, superiors, or coworkers, thus having fewer opportunities to achieve better economic 
outcomes (see Goldin 2014, for an overview). Second, women might self-select into lower-
paying jobs and be less likely to undertake lucrative opportunities.1  
 In this paper, we focus on the second explanation. The literature on decision-making has 
found that differences in behavioral traits partially explain differential sorting into careers and 
opportunities (see Niederle 2016 and Shurchkov and Eckel 2018 for comprehensive reviews of 
the literature). In particular, a seminal study by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007; hereafter NV) 
shows that men are twice as likely as women to enter competition when the environment is 
perceived to favor men, even when there is no significant gender gap in performance. They 
observe that women would be better off if they competed more.  
 Two salient explanatory factors of the gender gap in competitiveness are risk aversion 
and confidence. First, men are more willing to take risks, though the exact gap varies in size and 
significance (Shurchkov and Eckel 2018). Second, men are more overconfident in their own 
                                               
1 It is important to note that these decisions could be made in anticipation of discrimination and may not simply 
reflect different preferences. In this paper, we focus on the underlying reasons for individual choices, abstracting 
away from the additional societal pressures brought on by labor market discrimination. . 
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ability than women (Niederle and Vesterlund 2011). However, the literature has not reached a 
consensus on whether differential attitudes and reaction toward risk can fully explain the gender 
gap in tournament entry.2 Furthermore, the implications of the effect of risk aversion and 
overconfidence on the gender gap in economic outcomes are unclear: As a society, it may be 
undesirable to aim to “change” women to become more risk-loving and overconfident. In fact, 
these traits may lead to other potentially harmful side-effects (see Barber and O’Dean 2001 and 
Eckel and Fulbruhn 2016, for examples of excess aggressiveness on the part of male participants 
in financial markets contexts, for example). 
 This paper aims to elucidate the way in which gendered reactions to feedback may 
contribute to differences in choices, regardless of risk preferences and confidence. In particular, 
upon receiving feedback on performance, men and women may differentially attribute the 
feedback to luck versus ability, update their self-evaluation, and therefore enter competition at 
different rates.  
To study the attribution of feedback, we conducted a controlled online experiment. While 
observational studies may be preferable from the perspective of external validity, they do not 
allow the researcher to directly observe attribution of feedback. A controlled online experiment, 
on the other hand, allows us to exogenously vary the extent to which subjects have access to 
feedback and measure their attribution of said feedback. Our experimental data complement 
observational studies of gender differences in preferences and economic outcomes.  
In our experiment, participants first work on a real-effort task and learn their payment, 
determined partially by their own performance and partially by a random “luck” component. 
                                               
2 While much of the literature points to overconfidence and inherent competitiveness as primary explanations for the 
gender gap, with risk preferences playing a somewhat more modest role (Niederle and Vesterlund 2011), recent 
studies argue that overconfidence and risk preferences can, under some circumstances, fully eliminate the 
tournament entry gap (Gillen, Snowberg and Yariv 2017; van Veldhuizen 2017).  
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They are never informed of their score, which represents their real ability. We believe this 
closely resembles a real-world setting, since in the real-world, people often do not directly 
observe, but instead must infer, their own relative ability solely based on the outcome. Then, 
participants are separated into three treatment conditions based upon the feedback they receive: 
(a) no further feedback; (b) feedback on whether their payment was above or below the group 
average; (c) option to pay to receive feedback on whether their payment was above or below the 
group average. Finally, the participants in all three conditions are asked to attribute their payment 
outcome based on a scale that ranges from pure luck to pure ability (our measure of attribution). 
 Our first goal is to investigate if there is differential attribution of feedback by gender. 
Goldin (2013) has noted that women are less likely to major in economics after receiving what 
they perceive as unsatisfactory grades in introductory classes. Men, on the other hand, are far 
less likely to be discouraged away from majoring in economics given the same grade. Based on 
this observation, we hypothesize women to be more likely to attribute negative feedback to a 
lack of ability, whereas men to be more likely to attribute comparable negative feedback to bad 
luck. We also explore the patterns of attribution of positive feedback. Intuitively, women may 
take less credit for positive feedback relative to men. Our results confirm these hypotheses. A 
summary of our results is presented in the table below.  
Upon receiving negative feedback that undermines their positive self-evaluation (Cell A), 
women attribute this “negative surprise” to their lack of ability, whereas men blame bad luck. 
This finding is consistent with Goldin’s observation related to major choice. Upon receiving 
negative feedback that reinforces their negative self-evaluation (Cell B), both men and women 
attribute the negative outcome to lack of ability. Upon receiving positive feedback that reinforces 
their positive self-evaluation (Cell C), women do not take credit for the success and are more 
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likely to attribute the positive news to good luck, whereas men’s reaction to feedback in this 
condition is not significantly different from their counterparts who did not receive any feedback. 
Finally, we do not find consistent gender differences among the subjects who receive positive 
feedback reinforcing a pessimistic self-evaluation (Cell D).  




Men: attribute to luck 
Women: attribute to self 
(C) 
Men: no obvious reaction 




Men: attribute to self 
Women: attribute to self 
(D) 
No obvious reaction for both 
men and women 
 
Having established that there is a substantial gender difference in attribution of feedback, 
our second goal is to test if this gender gap in attribution may explain the gender differences in 
tournament entry. Intuitively, women who are more likely to attribute failures to lack of ability 
and successes to good luck may be the ones to fail who properly update their beliefs based on 
feedback and thus choose not to enter competition, generating a gender gap in tournament entry.  
First, we verify that our experimental setup elicits gender differences in tournament entry 
under the conditions where such disparities are expected to occur. In particular, women are 
significantly less likely to enter competition in mixed-gender groups in the no feedback 
condition. This is the case despite certain design differences that result in our tournament being 
relatively less intensely competitive than competition in NV and other previous studies (see 
Section 3.4 for reasons behind our specific design choices). Consistent with previous literature, 
we find that the gender gap in tournament entry is eliminated when the participants receive 
feedback (see Ertac and Szentes 2010) and when female participants are made aware that they 
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would be facing a woman in competition (see Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 2003 for the 
effects of single-sex competition on performance in tournaments).   
We then proceed to investigate the explanatory power of attribution in driving the gender 
gap in competitiveness. If attribution is a main explanatory variable bridging the gender gap in 
tournament entry, then controlling for attribution should eliminate the effect of gender. We find 
that the differential effect of attribution by gender renders the gender gap in tournament entry 
insignificant. We also investigate whether gender differences in risk aversion and overconfidence, 
which are in line with previous literature in our experiment, further explain the gap in 
tournament entry. The inclusion of these behavioral traits in the analysis indeed further reduces 
the gender gap in tournament entry, making it both statistically and economically insignificant. 
In addition, provided that feedback eliminates the gender gap in tournament entry, we 
explore how men and women self-select into tournament in the absence and in the presence of 
feedback. When there is no feedback on one’s relative performance, higher-performing women 
are more likely to select into competition, whereas men are equally likely to enter regardless of 
performance. This positive selection into tournament provides a tournament-entry counterpart of 
the findings by Exley, Niederle, and Vesterlund (2016), who observe positive self-selection into 
negotiation by women, but not by men. Upon receiving feedback, however, men and women 
exhibit similar patterns of tournament entry – higher score predicts a higher probability of entry.  
This implies that feedback eliminates the tournament entry gap by correcting previously 
suboptimal selection choices of low-performing men. 
Even though our experimental design is stylized and simplified when compared to real-
world situations, our findings have important implications. Although willingness to enter 
competition is sometimes associated with better economic outcomes, it is not always optimal to 
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force women to compete. Women in our experiment correctly sort into tournament based on their 
score even in the absence of feedback, whereas men tend to blindly enter competition. In general, 
timely feedback on performance helps to eliminate the gender difference in competitiveness, but 
the type of feedback is important and may lead to different consequences. The best feedback for 
women should emphasize the role of ability.  
Finally, because the tournament in the second stage of our experiment is identical to that 
in the first stage, our design abstracts away from additional positive aspects of persisting in 
competitive environments, such as human capital accumulation associated with progressing in a 
job or picking a particular competitive major of study. In those more realistic settings, 
misattribution might play an additional role that we cannot observe in our setting. In financial 
markets, unlucky high-ability female traders may misattribute losses to lack of ability rather than 
to bad luck and would thus be deterred from entering competitive environments. Closing the 
gender gap in attribution could therefore help to eliminate the gap in investment behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a brief literature review 
on gender difference in competitiveness and reaction to feedback. Chapter 3 describes the 
experiment design. Chapter 4 presents the results of the experiment. Chapter 5 concludes with 
some implication of the results and discusses potential future research.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
It has been widely documented that there is a gender gap in economic outcomes. A 
simple comparison between annual wages of full-time working women and men shows that 
women earn about 79% of what men do (Blau and Kahn, 2016). This gap in outcomes is 
accounted for by two channels: First, women tend to shy away from riskier but more lucrative 
fields (Kleinjans, 2008). Second, women achieve a lesser status relative to men within the same 
occupation. They may begin with similar entry-level jobs after graduation, but as their seniority 
increases, men are more likely to obtain executive positions and earn higher wages then women 
(Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010, Crespo, Simoes, and Moreira 2014). 
Two factors might explain the existence of a gender gap in occupation choices and in 
status achieved. First, women might simply be differentially treated by employers, superiors, or 
coworkers, contributing to the gender gap in within-occupation status (Wolfers 2015, Sarsons 
2017). Second, women might be less likely to search for or to undertake opportunities that might 
lead to career advancement or economic improvement. Women usually choose to enter less 
financially lucrative or socially prestigious professions (Buser, Niederle, and Oosterbeek 2014, 
Goldin 2017). Women are also less likely to invest in financial market, which is another 
opportunity that is conducive to economic outcomes: women display lower levels of financial 
literacy than men (for example, Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Almenberg and Dreber, 2012; de 
Bassa Scheresberg, 2013; Agnew and Harrison, 2016, Bucher-Koenen et al. 2016), manifest less 
financial market participation (Almenberg and Dreber 2012, Halko, Maustia and Alanko 2012), 
and exhibit less retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008). However, the gap in 
willingness to undertake opportunities does not necessarily reflect a gap in competency. 
 8 
Although women participate less in the stock market, those who do participate do better than 
men (Barber and Odean 2001). 
A caveat is that the two factors may reinforce each other and might be empirically 
confounding. If differential treatment exists and lowers the expected utility of a career move for 
women, then we might expect women to be less likely to pursue the opportunity. The existence 
of this interacting channel colors empirical analysis, as we may not be able to tell apart which 
factor is in action.  
This paper mainly focuses on the second factor, namely the gender gap in decision 
making, where women may be less likely to pursue financially lucrative opportunities. 
2.1 Competitiveness 
There is a consensus that the gender gap in decision-making is broadly attributable to a 
gap in competitiveness, as many opportunities are competitive in nature. Researchers have found 
that women and men differ in their reaction towards competition: men are more willing to enter 
competitions in the first place (NV, Shurchkov and Eckel 2018). Within competition, men tend 
to outperform women, while this difference in performance disappears in non-competitive 
environments (Croson & Gneezy 2004, Shurchkov and Eckel 2018).  
There is a significant gender difference in the decision to enter competition. In their 
seminal paper on this topic, NV used a stereotypically male task that involved adding up sets of 
five two-digit numbers within a certain time limit. They then compared the probability of men 
and women to self-select into a winner-take-all tournament payment scheme, where each 
participant’s score is compared with three other participants’, and only the winner in the group 
gets an extra bonus. They found that men select the winner-take-all payment scheme twice as 
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often as women. This gap is not explained by participants’ performance – some well-performing 
women also selected piece-rate payment and, as a result, hurt themselves financially.  
It is important to note, however, that the gender stereotype associated with the task may 
elicits different levels of gender gap. While women are found to be less competitive in 
stereotypically male tasks (for example, Dargnies, 2012; Brandts, Groenert, and Rott, 2014; 
Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek, 2014), some studies noted that stereotypically female tasks 
rarely induce gender difference in tournament entry (Kamas and Preston 2009; Shurchkov 2012).  
In terms of gender gap in performance within competition, the literature has less 
consensus. Some studies using the addition task in NV’s design did find such a gender gap in 
performance within tournament (for example, NV, Healy and Pate 2011; Buser, Niederle, and 
Oosterbeek 2014). However, studies examining other stereotypically male-favoring tasks did 
find a difference in performance under tournament-based payment scheme (for example, Gneezy, 
Niederle, and Rustichini 2003, Gneezy and Rustichini 2004, Shurchkov 2012, Schram, Brandys, 
and Bërxhani 2016). 
So far, we have established that there is a gender gap in attitudes towards and reactions to 
competition. The natural question now is: What explains the gap in competitiveness? Two salient 
factors are risk aversion and confidence.  
The consensus in the literature is that women exhibit greater risk aversion (Eckel and 
Grossman 2002, Charness and Gneezy 2011) and lower levels of confidence (Beyer 1990, 
Barber and Odean 2001). Some studies found that risk aversion explains the gender gap 
(Balafoutas, Kerschbamer, and Sutter 2011, Gillen, Snowberg, Yariv (2017)) while others argued 
that the gender gap persists even after controlling for risk preferences (NV). In terms of 
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confidence, NV argued that overconfidence of men explains a portion of gender difference in 
tournament entry. However, a significant gap remains after controlling for confidence level. 
We aim to elucidate a third explanatory variable for the gender gap in competitiveness: 
attribution of feedback. In the real-world, the outcome one obtains is usually determined by 
one’s own ability and an external luck component. Upon receiving feedback on the outcome, 
men and women may attribute the feedback differently to ability and luck, and therefore have a 
different tournament entry pattern. 
 
2.2 Feedback 
There has been an extensive literature on the reaction to feedback in psychology. The 
main finding is self-attribution bias: a tendency for people to attribute success to their own 
ability but ascribe failure to some external factors to maintain self-esteem (Miller & Ross, 1975; 
Mezulis et al. 2004; Aronson et al. 2013). Some economic studies have replicated this self-
serving interpretation of feedback. People prefer feedback that suggests an external cause of poor 
performance to feedback that suggests poor ability (Liden and Mitchel, 1985); people prefer to 
attribute good performance to their own ability (Hoffman and Post 2014). Positive feedback to 
performance is also interpreted as more informative and elicits a stronger behavioral reaction 
than negative feedback (Mobius et al. 2014, Eil and Rao 2011, Love, Love, and Northcreaft 
2010). In addition, people are more likely to agree with and to react to the feedback that is 
consistent with their self-appraisal (Korsgaard 1996).  
 There is also gender-specific reaction to feedback. Mobius et al. (2014) found that, 
provided with a feedback, positive or negative, women revised their beliefs about their 
performance less than men do. Berlin and Dargnies (2016), however, found the opposite results: 
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women reacted more strongly than men to both positive and negative feedback – they became 
more confident after receiving positive feedback and less confident after negative feedback. Note 
a major difference between the two studies that might explain the opposite results: The feedback 
in Mobius et al. (2014)’s study has a 75% accuracy, but the feedback in Dargnies (2016)’s study 
is guaranteed to be correct. It is not hard to imagine that people react more strongly to accurate 
feedback than to not fully accurate ones. Another study by McCarty (1986) notes that women are 
less confident than men, regardless of what feedback they receive.  
 Two studies linking reaction to feedback to tournament entry are worth more attention for 
purpose of this study. Ertac and Szentes (2010) found that performance feedback reduced the 
gender gap in competitiveness. They closely followed NV’s design and observed that, when 
there was no performance feedback, women were less likely than men to choose a winner-take-
all payment scheme. However, upon receiving a feedback about the highest score in the group, 
there was no gender difference in decision to compete. Another study by Brandt, Groenert, and 
Rott (2014) studied the effect of advice on entry of competition. Instead of an objective 
performance feedback, participants in their study received a piece of advice from a more 
informed advisor regarding what payment scheme they should choose for the next round of 
problem solving. Note that a normative advice is potentially different from a descriptive 
feedback. One can follow advice from other people without being able to come up with the same 
conclusion from the feedback. The results show that more high-performing women self-selected 
into tournament payment after being advised to do so, but the gender gap in tournament entry 
remained. 
  Our study is innovative and contributes to the literature in two ways: 1. Most existing 
studies focus on feedback of performance (ability). While these studies provide a good starting 
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point, they are not realistic in representing the real-world situation, since feedback in real-world 
is usually determined by both ability and luck. In our experiment, the feedback participants 
receive depends on both their performance in a task and a random luck component. 2. 
Benefitting from our design of feedback, we can examine the channel through which feedback 
influences competitiveness, namely, men and women’s differential attribution of feedback to 
luck and ability. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the mechanism between 
feedback and competitiveness.  
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Chapter 3: Experimental Design 
The goal of this study is to investigate whether women and men differ in how they 
attribute positive feedback (successes) and negative feedback (failures) to their own ability 
versus to luck, and, if the gender difference in attribution exists, to examine whether it explains 
the gender gap in tournament entry decisions.  
We use a controlled online survey experiment in order to measure attribution and control 
the level of feedback participants receive. Participants complete a section of problem solving, get 
feedback, and attribute their successes and failures. They then choose between a piece-rate 
payment scheme and a tournament-based payment scheme, and proceed to complete another 
section of problem solving. Attribution is measured by participants’ assignment of the positive or 
negative feedback to their own ability versus luck, scaled from 0 to 100. A score of 100 means 
attributing the feedback entirely to ability, and a score of 0 means attributing entirely to luck. 
Tournament entry is elicited through subjects’ choice of tournament-based payment scheme for 
the second round of problem solving. We also gauge participants’ confidence level by two 
measures: We ask participants to estimate their score in the first problem solving section 
(henceforth score-confidence) and to evaluate whether their payment from the first section is 
above or below average (henceforth payment-confidence). Risk preference is measured as a self-
reported risk level by subjects, scale from 1 to 10, where 10 indicates an extreme willingness to 
take risks, and 0 means an extreme risk aversion. 
Our design differs from the existing literature in the following two ways. First, most 
experiments that focus on behavioral traits use a traditional laboratory setting, while we explore 
an emerging online participant pool via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Research has shown 
that workers on MTurk exhibit similar heuristics and biases as subjects from tradition sources. 
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They also pay attention to the instructions as least as much as traditional subjects (Paolacci, 
Chandler, and Ipeirotis, 2010; Germine et al. 2012). The only concern is that workers on MTurk 
are usually more experienced than subjects in traditional labs, since they may have constantly 
participated in experiments.  
Second, unlike NV and other subsequent studies (e.g., Shurchkov 2012, Kamas and 
Preston 2012, Brandts, Groenert, and Rott 2014) that use a winner-take-all payment scheme with 
groups of four competitors, we adopt a less competitive tournament payment scheme, where 
participants compete against just one other competitor and where the loser is still guaranteed to 
receive a certain payment. The winner-take-all design of previous literature is realistic when 
modeling some scenarios, such as those where only one among many gets a promotion 
opportunity; however, when taking a broader view, our more continuous payment scheme is 
more realistic, since we may expect that, on average, the expected reward is continuous in, say, 
human capital.  
 
3.1. The Task 
The experiment involves two sections of problem solving. For both sections, participants 
work on Mental Rotation Test (MRT).3 It is a test in which participants see a target three-
dimensional shape made of 10 cubes and identify the rotated version of the target shape among 
three choices (Figure 1 shows a sample problem).  
 
                                               
3 The MRT questions we use in our experiment is slightly different from the original MRT (Vandenberg and Kuse 
1978). In the original MRT, there are four choices for each target shape. Exactly two of the choices are correct. 
Participants get 1 point for each correct choice and lose 1 point for each wrong choice. In order to reduce the 
difficulty level, we take out one of the correct choices for each target shape, and remove the penalty. Therefore, in 
our MRT, participants choose one out of three choices. They get one point for each correct answer and zero point for 
each wrong or blank answer. 
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This type of task is selected based on two criteria: (1) the task is stereotypically perceived 
to favor men, and (2) there is no actual difference in performance between men and women. 4 
Our pilot studies show that, when asked to evaluate if women or men would score higher on the 
MRT, significantly more participants selected men (p < 0.05). Pilot results also show that the 
actual scores do not differ significantly between men and women (p = 0.13). Note that we depart 
from the literature that typically uses an addition task, because it is impossible to prevent online 
subjects from using a calculator. Similarly, in the pilot, we also experimented with a 
                                               
4 Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2012) found that men and women do not perform significantly differently in MRT when 
they did not know the gender of their rivals. However, the MRT questions adopted in their experiment are different 
from ours. They showed participants two shapes and asked them to indicate if the two shapes are rotated versions or 
mirror images of each other, whereas we ask participants to choose, among three choices, a rotated version of a 
target shape. We did not find a significant gender gap in performance in pilot study. However, in the main study, 
men significantly outperform women. The psychology literature (e.g. Feng, Spence, and Pratt 2007) has also shown 
that MRT consistently elicits gender difference in performance.  
Figure 1. 
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stereotypically female-favoring task, namely, the anagram task. However, we found that 
participants were able to, and in fact did, use online search engines to achieve perfect scores. 
Before completing the first section of problem-solving, each participant is given the MRT 
instructions, as well as a practice problem. They cannot advance to the real problem-solving 
section until they correctly solve the practice question.  
 Within each problem-solving section, 8 MRT questions are presented on one web page. 
The order of the questions is randomized for each participant. Participants have exactly 2.5 
minutes to complete as many questions as possible.  
After completing the task, participants estimate their scores in this section of problem-
solving (score-confidence); we do not explicitly tell participants the total number of questions in 
this section. 
 
3.2 The Treatments 
 We adopt a 2x3 design where the two treatments are the gender information of the 
opponent in Section 1 and the feedback information the participant receives. 
After participants finish the first section of MRT, they are informed that their score is 
compared with a randomly selected participant who had previously taken the same test, and their 
payment is calculated in the following way: If their score is higher than that of their random 
match, then they get 20 cents for each correct answer; if their score is lower than that of their 
random match, then they get 15 cents for each correct answer. 
Afterwards, we tell them the payment they earned from the first section of MRT. The 
exact wording of the payment information varies depending on which gender treatment the 
participants are assigned to. 
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3.2.1 Match with unknown gender 
 In this treatment group, participants see their payment without learning anything about 
the gender of their random match: 
“Our matching process has randomly matched you with a participant from the other 
group. Your score has been compared with his/hers, and your payment is shown below.” 
We use a gender noncommittal pronoun “his/hers” to express that the random match might be 
either gender.  
Immediately after participants learn their payment, they are asked to evaluate whether 
their payment is above average or below average (i.e. payment-confidence). Their evaluation in 
this treatment establishes a baseline level of payment-confidence. 
3.2.2 Match with known gender 
 In this treatment group, we reveal the gender of the randomly selected match when 
informing participants of their payment from the first problem-solving section.  
 “Our matching process has randomly matched you with a female (male) participant from 
the other group. Your score has been compared with hers (his), and your payment is shown 
below.” 
The choice of “female” (hers) and “male” (his) depends on the actual gender of the randomly 
match.5 The gender specification is made implicit but repeated twice (“female participant”, and 
“her”, for example) to prevent participant from guessing the intention and to ensure they pick up 
the cue. 
 Then we elicit participants’ payment-confidence, later compared with the baseline 
payment-confidence in the unknown-gender condition. This treatment is intended to examine 
                                               
5 One participant from the pilot study indicated that neither “she” or “him” are preferred pronoun. We dropped this 
participant as a potential randomly. 
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whether people react differently when they know the gender of their match. We speculate that 
women might be less payment-confident when they realize that they are competing with men. On 
the other hand, men may be more payment-confident when they see that their opponent is a 
woman.  
 Afterwards, participants are further assigned to three feedback conditions.  
3.2.3 No feedback condition 
 In this condition, we do not give any feedback on participants’ payment or score in the 
first section of MRT. Participants are asked to attribute their payment to luck or ability based on 
their payment-confidence – for example, if the participant is payment-confident, we ask to what 
extent she would attribute her purportedly above average payment to ability versus luck; if the 
participant is not payment-confident, she would attribute her purportedly below average payment. 
3.2.4 Forced feedback condition 
 In this condition, after participants report their payment-confidence, we give them 
feedback on whether their payment is actually above or below average. Participants are then 
asked to attribute their below or above average payment (based on the feedback) to ability versus 
luck.  
3.2.5 Optional feedback condition 
 In this condition, participants have an opportunity to give up some of their payment in 
exchange for feedback on whether their payment actually exceeds the group average.  
We first present a few “prices” of the feedback. Participants then indicate the maximum 
price they are willing to pay for the feedback about their relative payment. Afterwards, we 
randomly draw a price from the presented price options. If the participant indicates that she is 
willing to pay the randomly drawn price, then the price is subtracted from her payment, and she 
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receives feedback about whether her payment is actually above or below average. If the 
participant indicates that she is not willing to pay, then she does not get any feedback. 
For participants who do not get any feedback, their attribution is with respect to their own 
payment-confidence. For participants who get feedback, their attribution is with respect to their 
actual relative performance. 
We use a 2x3 treatment design. The following table shows the total number of 
participants in each treatment condition for each wave.6 
 Gender of Opponent 
Unknown 
Gender of Opponent 
Known 
No feedback condition Wave 1: 46 
Wave 3: 52 
Wave 1: 58 
Wave 3: 48 
Forced feedback condition Wave 1: 58 
Wave 2: 44 
Wave 3: 46 
Wave 1: 44 
Wave 2: 44 
Wave 3: 52 
Choice of feedback condition Wave 1: 49 Wave 1: 52 
 
3.3. Attribution of success and failures 
 After receiving these feedback conditions, participants move a slider to assign relative 
importance to the two components that contribute to their payment, luck and ability (see Figure 
2).  
For participants who attribute a negative outcome (whether the negative outcome is 
perceived or actual), the two components are (1) “my performance on the test that resulted in a 
lower score,” and (2) “my luck to be randomly paired with a participant who scored higher than 
me.” For participants who attribute a positive outcome, the two components are (1) “my 
performance on the test that resulted in a higher score,” and (2) “my luck to be randomly paired 
with a participant who scored lower than me.”  
                                               




The measure of attribution is scaled from 0 to 100. A value of 100 means attributing 
one’s payment entirely to one’s own performance on the test; a value of 0 means attributing 
one’s payment entirely to luck of being paired with a specific match. 
 
3.4. Tournament entry 
 Before the second section of problem solving began, participants choose between a 
tournament-based payment scheme and a piece-rate payment scheme: 
• Piece rate: Participant gets 17.5 cents for each correct answer, regardless of anyone else’s 
score. 
• Tournament payment: We randomly pair the participant with a match from the other 
group. If the participant’s score is higher than the match’s, then the participant gets 25 
cents for each correct answer. If the participant’s score is lower than the match’s, then the 
participant gets 10 cents for each correct answer. 
Participants’ bonus payment in the second round of problem solving is calculated based on the 
payment scheme they choose.   
Figure 2. 
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 Note that we did not choose a winner-take-all payment scheme: This is different from the 
design of many previous literatures, including NV. Granted that the winner-take-all design is 
realistic when modeling some scenarios, such as promotion, we believe our design is more 
realistic when taking a broader view of the real world. For example, Alice and Bob compete for 
gold and silver medals, and Alice gets the gold medal and Bob gets the silver medal. If we only 
look at who gets the gold medal, then reward is indeed winner-take-all, but the bird’s eye view 
suggests that our payment scheme is more reasonable in this setting. 
 
3.5. The procedure 
 The experiment was conducted online via MTurk. Participants were directed to our 
experiment pages if they chose to participate. A consent form was presented to the participants 
prior to the beginning of the experiment. Participants were encouraged to print out and save a 
copy of the consent form. Participants who indicated they are willing to participate then 
advanced to the general instruction of the experiment.  
 Participants were informed in the beginning of the experiment that there would be an 
attention checking question in the survey. Participants who failed to answer this question 
correctly were directed to the ending page. They did not get any payment for participating in the 
experiment.  
 For each problem-solving section, time ran out automatically. Participants could not 
advance to the next page before the end of 2.5 minutes. Once the time ran out, the webpage 
automatically jumped to the next page. 
 At the end of the experiment, each participant filled out a short questionnaire. The 
questionnaire asked participants questions on demographics, beliefs, and preferences. In 
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particular, participants reported their age and gender. To gauge the gender perception associated 
with MRT, we also asked participants if they think women or men are more likely to get a high 
score in the problem-solving section. We also elicited participants’ risk preference by asking 
them to self-report, on a scale of 1 to 10, how willing and prepared they are to take risks. 
Research has shown that the self-reported risk level correlates significantly with experimental 
outcome of risk. It is also a common practice to elicit risk preference through a hypothetical 
question (Kagel and Roth, 2016). 
 After participants finished the experiment, they were paid a base payment of $0.5 dollars 
for completion. The final payment, including their bonus payment earned in two problem-solving 
sections, was transferred to their account within seven days. Including the base payment, the 
average payment was $2.1. The maximum payment was $4.1. The average duration of 
experiment was about 11 minutes.  
We conducted three waves of data collection. In the first wave, we administered the full 
experiment design as described above. MTurk recorded 308 completed responses. 1 participant 
failed to pass our attention check. In the second wave, we corrected a mistake made in the first 
round, and included only the forced feedback condition, as the error affected the forced feedback 
condition the most.7 88 valid answers were recorded. In the third wave, we excluded the optional 
feedback condition, because very few people actually opted into receiving feedback, and it is 
difficult to compare those who sorted into receiving feedback against those who did not. We also 
dropped the attribution question, concerned that attribution may prime tournament entry. A total 
of 198 valid answers were collected in this round.  
                                               
7 A coding error in Wave 1 of experiment resulted in some participants receiving negative feedback when they 
should have received positive feedback. The error did not affect anything other than the feedback received by some 





The table below presents a list of key concepts and variables with their respective 
definitions: 
Variable or concept Description 
Score-confidence Participants’ self-evaluation of the number of questions they 
answer correctly in Section 1. The value ranges from 0 to 10.  
Payment-confidence A participant is payment-confident if she rates her payment as 
above average. She is not payment-confident otherwise. 
Score in Section 1 The actual score a participant receives in Section 1, ranging 
from 0 to 8. 
Attribution A value from 0 to 100 where 0 represents that the participant 
attributes her outcome entirely to luck and 100 represents that 
she attributes entirely to performance. 
Gender of match The information that the participant receives regarding the 
gender of her randomly selected opponent. The gender of her 
match is one of male, female, or gender-unknown.  
Feedback positivity A feedback is positive if it indicates that payment is above 
average, and negative otherwise. 
Feedback condition There are three feedback conditions: no feedback, forced 
feedback, and optional feedback.  
Tournament entry An indicator variable for whether a participant chooses the 
tournament-based payment scheme. 
Risk A self-reported value of risk preference ranging from 0 to 10, 
with higher values indicating more willing and more prepared 
to take risks. 
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Chapter 4. Analysis of Experimental Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of demographic information and performs balance 
tests between treatment groups based on demographics. Only 9 out of 94 comparisons are 
significant at the 0.05 level. Provided that all the procedures are randomized in the survey, we 
proceed to analyze the results.8 The educational background of study participants is fairly similar 
to the national average in the United States, though skewing slightly towards being more 
educated (Ryan and Siebens, 2016). The racial makeup in our study skews towards white and 
from African-Americans and other minorities (US Census). The income makeup in our study is 
similar to the national distribution (US Census).  
Table 2 reports summary statistics of key experimental variables by treatment and gender. 
In the main study, men outperform women in Section 1. In this section, there is no pressure of 
competition, since participants do not learn the payment scheme until after they completed 
Section 1. Therefore, their performance in this section should replicate results in ordinary MRT 
studies. Indeed, there is a consensus in psychology that MRT consistently elicits gender 
difference in performance (Masters and Sanders, 1993). Our results in the main experiment are 
different from the results in the pilot study, which found no significant difference between men 
and women in the MRT. A potential cause of the difference is the relatively small sample of 
participants in the pilot study. 
                                               








For the rest of this paper, we pooled the three waves when conducting analyses. Separate 
analysis based on each wave is shown in Appendices 2 through 4.  
 
4.2 Gender gaps in risk aversion and confidence 
We first verify that our experimental design elicits gender gaps in behavioral traits such 
as risk aversion or confidence. Table 3 presents the results of a simple OLS regressions 
comparing men and women along these traits.  
Table 3. Gender Gap in Risk Preference, Score-confidence, and Payment-confidence 













            
female -1.25*** -0.75*** -0.49*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 
 (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) 
score in Section 1   0.44***  -0.09*** 
   (0.04)  (0.01) 
      
Dependent 
variable mean 
5.12 3.94 3.94 0.53 0.53 
Observations 590 593 593 593 593 
R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.16 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
All specifications are based on data from all three waves. In Column 1, risk is on a scale from 1 to 
10, with 0 representing extreme unwillingness to take risks and 10 representing extreme willingness 
to take risks. In Column 2 and 3, score-confidence is measured on a scale of 0 to 10. As a 
comparison, the highest possible score in Section 1 is 8.  
 
In terms of risk preference, men self-report to be more willing and more prepared to take 
risks than women (Column 1 of Table 3). Provided that self-reported risk preference highly 
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correlates with actual risk aversion uniformly across gender, our finding is consistent with the 
literature (see for example Charness and Gneezy 2011). 
In terms of confidence, our results also confirm previous findings (for example, Beyer, 
1990) with both measures of confidence showing that men self-evaluate more highly than 
women.  
First, men are more score-confident than women (Column 2 of Table 3). Out of 8 
questions, men on average estimate themselves to solve 4.32 questions, whereas women estimate 
3.57 (p < 0.01). The difference remains significant after we control for the actual score in Section 
1 (Column 3 of Table 3). Second, men are more payment-confident than women: 64% of women 
are not payment-confident, whereas only 42% of men hold the same belief (Column 4 of Table 
3). The difference remains significant after we control for the score in Section 1 (Column 5 of 
Table 3).  
We then examine the two measures of confidence, score-confidence and payment-
confidence, separately in more detail. Figure 3 plots the relationship between participants’ 
expected and actual scores in Section 1. We make three observations: 1) Men are systematically 
more score-confident (p < 0.05) than women, conditional on getting the same score. 2) Men with 
median performance (solved 4 out of 8 questions) on average correctly estimate their scores. 
Women at the median, on the other hand, underestimate their score. 3) Participants of both 
genders with higher-than-median performance tend to underestimate their score (for women: 
Mean(actual score) = 5.74; Mean(expected score) = 4.48; p < 0.01. For men: Mean(actual score) 
= 6.05; Mean(expected score) = 5.11; p < 0.01). Participants of both genders with lower-than-
median performance tend to overestimate their score (for women: Mean(actual score) = 2.23; 
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Mean(expected score) = 3.02; p < 0.01. For men: Mean(actual score) = 2.35; Mean(expected 
score) = 3.44; p < 0.01).  
 
In addition, we use a linear probability model below to test how one’s own gender and 
the gender of the opponent affect participants’ payment-confidence.9 !"#	%&'()*#	+"*,-.)*#= 	01 + 03	,)(&4) + 056)*.)78*9*":*	(&#+ℎ +	0<(&4)	*&#+ℎ+ 0=,)(>6)*.)78*9*":*	(&#+ℎ + 0?,)(>(&4)	(&#+ℎ + @, 
We show the results in Table 4. 
  
                                               
9 Results are robust to a logistic specification and estimates are available upon request. 
Figure 3. The relation between estimated and actual scores 
Notes: This graph is the sample average score-confidence, conditional on 
actual score in Section 1, separated by gender.    
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Table 4. Influence of Gender of the Opponent on Payment-confidence   
Dependent variable: not payment confident  
  (1) (2) 
    
female 0.09 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
gender-unknown match -0.11 -0.08 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
male match -0.11 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
femaleXgender-unknown match 0.17* 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
femaleXmale match 0.18 0.11 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
score in Section 1  -0.09*** 
  (0.01) 
risk  -0.01 
  (0.01) 
   
Dependent variable mean 0.53 0.53 
F-test of female (p-value) <0.0001 0.0006 
F-test of gender of match (p-value) 0.4580 0.7281 
Observations 593 590 
R-squared 0.06 0.16 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Not payment confident is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant thinks his/her 
payment is below average, and equals 0 otherwise. Score in Section 1 is an integer between 0 
and 8. F-test of female tests against the null hypothesis that female, femaleXgender-unknown 
match, and femaleXmale match are jointly zero. F-test of gender of match tests against the null 
hypothesis that male match, gender-unknown match, femaleXmale match, and 
femaleXgender-unknown match are jointly zero. 
 
 The F-test of female reported at the bottom of the table demonstrates that gender 
significantly predicts payment confidence. The F-test of gender of match, however, indicates that 
the gender of the opponent does not affect payment-confidence. We also find that female 
participants’ payment-confidence does not respond differently than men to the gender of their 
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opponent (F-test p-value not shown). Column 2 reveals that, as expected, receiving a higher 
score in Section 1 significantly increases payment-confidence.  
In sum, we find the following results: 
1. Men are more willing and more inclined to take risks than women, which is 
consistent with the literature. 
2. Men are more confident than women in their performance and payment in the first 
problem solving section. This again replicates the gender gap found in past studies.  
 
4.3 Gender Gap in Competitiveness 
4.3.1 In the absence of feedback  
In terms of competitiveness, we first focus on people who did not receive feedback, as 
past literature has consistently shown a significant gender gap in tournament entry in the absence 
of performance feedback. We find an economically meaningful (7 percentage points), but not 
statistically significant gender gap in the no feedback condition (Column 1 of Table 5).  
When we allow tournament entry to differ with respect to the gender of the opponent 
(Column 3 of Table 5), we find that the gender difference emerges when women expect to face a 
male opponent. F-test of female at the bottom of the table shows that the gender difference in 
tournament entry is significant (p < 0.05) controlling for the gender of the opponent. When 
facing a female opponent, women are more likely to enter competition than men (p < 0.1).  
However, when facing either a male opponent for sure or when there is a likelihood of facing a 
male opponent in the gender-unknown condition, women are significantly less likely to enter the 
tournament. This finding is in line with NV and other previous work that restricts the design to 
mixed-gender competitions without feedback.  
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Table 5. Gender Gap in Competitiveness 
Dependent variable: tournament entry 
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   F-test of gender of 
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R-squared 0.01 0.00   0.04 0.20  0.01 0.17  0.04 0.00 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
F-test of female tests against the null hypothesis that female, femaleXgender-unknown match, and femaleXmale match are jointly zero. 
F-test of gender of match tests against the null hypothesis that male match, gender-unkown match, femaleXmale match, and 
femaleXgender-unknown match are jointly zero. 
 
4.3.2 In the presence of feedback 
Studies on the effect of feedback have documented that feedback helps eliminate the 
gender gap in tournament entry (Ertac and Szentes 2010), so one might expect participants who 
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receive feedback to exhibit no gender difference in competitiveness.10 To test this, we compare 
the gender gap in tournament entry for participants who did not receive feedback and those who 
did – Comparing Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5, we observe that the gap decreases to almost zero 
in forced feedback without controls for behavior traits and scores (Column 2 of Table 5). 
Comparing Columns 3 and 4 to Columns 5 and 6, the gender-differential reaction to gender of 
the opponent disappears when people received feedback. F-test of female at the bottom shows 
that men and women do not differ in the rate of tournament entry. This finding suggests that 
feedback, on average, eliminates gender gap in tournament entry.  
To further verify the effect of feedback on tournament entry, we restrict the sample to 
participants who faced a male or gender-unknown opponent and investigate the gender gap in no 
feedback condition and in forced feedback condition (Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5). While men 
are significantly more likely to enter competition in the no feedback condition, they do not 
behave differently from women once provided a feedback. Our findings are consistent with Ertac 
and Szentes (2010). 
4.3.3 Differential selection into tournament by gender 
 We also investigate how women and men self-select into tournament. Figure 4 plots the 
relationship between score in Section 1 and the probability of tournament entry for men and 
women in the no feedback condition and in the forced feedback condition. In the absence of 
feedback, women are generally more likely to enter tournament as their score in Section 1 
increases. However, for men, there is a slight U-shaped relationship between tournament entry 
and score, indicating that low-performing men are more likely to enter competition as their score 
                                               
10 In future analysis, we exclude people who are in optional feedback condition for two reasons: 1. Very few 
participants in optional feedback condition got feedback because participants were unwilling to pay the randomly 
drawn price. Those who selected into getting feedback may be different from those who received feedback for free. 
2. The opportunity of paying for feedback might change participants’ reaction and behavior afterward, making the 
optional feedback condition not comparable to the no feedback condition or the forced feedback condition.   
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decreases. When feedback on relative payment is present, men and women exhibit similar 
pattern of tournament entry – higher probability of entering as score increase. Generally, the 
tournament entry pattern of men seems to be more affected by feedback. Low performing men 
do not enter competition once they receive feedback on their relative payment.  
 
 
To verify the selection pattern into tournament, we run the following OLS regression: B"C7*&()*#	)*#7' = 01 +	03,)(&4) +		05(&4)>D+"7)	-*	E)+#-"*	1 +	0<,)(&4)	>D+"7)	-*	E)+#-"*	1 + @, 
examining participants who did not receive feedback and participants who did separately. We 
present results in Table 6.  
  
Figure 4. Local linear regression of tournament entry on score 
 35 
Table 6. Gender Difference in Self-selection into Tournament 
Dependent variable: tournament entry 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
 Samples No Feedback 
 
Forced Feedback 
        female -0.07 -0.27* -0.25 
 
0.01 0.10 0.19 
 
(0.07) (0.16) (0.16) 
 
























   
0.06*** 
   
(0.01) 





   
-0.02 
   
(0.02) 
   
(0.02) 
Dependent variable 
mean 0.39 0.39 0.39 
 
0.35 0.35 0.35 






Observations 204 204 204 
 
288 288 287 
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.06 
 
0.0002 0.05 0.13 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
In Columns 1 to 3, we restrict the sample to participants who were assigned to the no feedback 
condition. In Columns 4 to 6, we restrict the sample to participants who were assigned to the 
forced feedback condition. F-test of interactions tests against the null hypothesis that 
maleXscore in Section 1 is equal to femaleXscore in Section 1. 
 
In the absence of feedback (Columns 1 to 3), scoring one point higher is associated with 
an approximately seven percentage points increase in the probability of entering tournament (p < 
0.05) for women. However, for men, scoring one point higher is not associated with a substantial 
change in tournament entry pattern. Similar results hold after controlling for risk and confidence. 
The F-test of interactions at the bottom of the table shows that women and men react differently 
to an increase in score. These results resemble the findings by Exley, Niederle, and Vesterlund 
(2016). They observe that women positive self-select into negotiation, whereas men do not. Our 
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results serve as a mirror image in tournament entry. In the absence of feedback, women’s self-
selection into tournament seems to be more efficient than men’s. Men enter competition 
regardless of how well they perform. 
Upon receiving a feedback on relative payment (Columns 4 to 6), men and women do not 
differ in tournament entry pattern for an additional point in Section 1 (F-test of interactions at the 
bottom of the table). Both men and women are more likely to enter competition as their score in 
Section 1 increases.  
In short, we find that: 
1. Conditional on having faced a male opponent or a gender-unknown opponent, men are 
more likely than women to enter competition in the absence of feedback.  
2. On average, feedback eliminates the observed conditional gender gap in tournament entry.  
3. In the absence of feedback, women positively self-select into tournament based on score, 
whereas men do not. Provided feedback on relative payment, both men and women 
positively self-select into competition.  
 
4.4 Gender gaps in attribution of feedback 
 In this section, we investigate whether men and women react differently to feedback. In 
particular, upon receiving positive and negative feedback, do men and women differently 
attribute the feedback to their own ability versus luck. 
Question 1: Given negative feedback, are women more likely than men to attribute it to 
lack of ability? 
Question 2: Given positive feedback, are women more likely than men to attribute it to 
good luck? 
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To test if there is a differential attribution of feedback, we adopt the following regression 
specification:11 G##7-HC#-"* = 	01 + 03	,)(&4) +	05	(&4)>*)6&#-I)	,)).H&+9 +	0<	,)(&4)>*)6&#-I)	,)).H&+9 + @, 
restricting to participants who received feedback.  
 We separate the analyses into two cases, depending on whether participants are payment-
confident. The results are in Table 7.  
Among participants who are not payment-confident (Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7), men 
who receive negative feedback confirming their belief, as opposed to receiving positive feedback, 
attribute the negative outcome to their lack of ability (p < 0.05). Women react similarly, although 
the adjustment in attribution is smaller than that of men. An F-test of interactions shows that 
there is no significant difference in attribution between men and women after receiving 
reinforcing negative feedback. 
Among participants who are payment-confident (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7), men who 
receive negative feedback attribute the negative surprise to bad luck (p < 0.01). On the other 
hand, women who receive the same, surprising, negative feedback, attribute the negative 
outcome to their lack of ability (p < 0.05). F-test of interactions at the bottom of the table shows 
that there is a significant difference in attribution between men and women after receiving the 
negative surprise (p < 0.01). Note that the coefficient on female is also significant in this case, 
indicating that, when receiving positive feedback, payment-confident women are more likely 
than their male counterparts to attribute it to good luck (p < 0.05). 
  
                                               
11 Wave 3 of the experiment does not ask for participant’s attribution, so this analysis is only based on Wave 1 and 
Wave 2. 
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Table 7. Gender Difference in Attribution of Feedback 
Dependent variable: attribution 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Samples Not Payment-Confident 
 
Payment-Confident 
      
 
    
















































      Dependent variable mean 67.60 67.60 
 
67.69 67.69 
F-test of interactions (p-value) 0.1778 0.1877 
 
<0.0001 <0.0001 
Observations 97 96 
 
93 93 
R-squared 0.10 0.11   0.21 0.21 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Only Wave 1 and Wave 2 of our experiment included the attribution question. Therefore, this 
regression analysis is based on these two waves. The entire analysis shown in this table is 
restricted to participants who received feedback. In Columns 1 and 2, titled "Not Payment-
Confident", we further restrict the sample to participants who were not payment-confident. In 
Columns 3 and 4, titled "Payment-Confident", we restrict the sample to participants who were 
payment-confident. F-test of interactions tests against the null hypothesis that maleXnegative 
feedback is equal to femaleXnegative feedback.  
 
 To verify our findings with the effect of feedback, we consider those who did not get 
feedback and compare their attribution to those who did get feedback: 
 G##7-HC#-"* = 	01 + 03	,)(&4) +	05	(&4)>,"7+). +	0<	,)(&4)>,"7+). + @, 
where 	,"7+). is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the participant is in the forced feedback 
condition, and equals 0 if the participant is in the no feedback condition.  
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We note the following caveat: the measure of attribution differs slightly for people in the 
no feedback condition and in the forced feedback condition. Consider the following example. If a 
participant self-evaluated to have an above-average payment, then if she were assigned to no 
feedback condition, then she would be attributing her success to her ability or luck, whereas if 
she were assigned to forced feedback condition and received a negative feedback, then she 
would be attributing her failure to either her ability or her luck. In short, whether or not a 
participant receives feedback determines whether she is attributing her perceived payment or her 
actual payment, which potentially complicates our interpretation with the interaction of ,)(&4)>,"7+). in the above regression. Nonetheless, we expect to see similar pattern with this 
specification.  
We separate the analyses into four cases, depending on participants’ payment-confidence 
and feedback positivity: positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, positive surprise, and 
negative surprise. We define the four cases below. Table 8 presents the results.  
 Payment-confident Not payment-confident 
(Potential) positive 
feedback12 Positive reinforcement Positive surprise 
(Potential) negative 
feedback Negative surprise Negative reinforcement 
 
After getting a reinforcing negative feedback (Columns 1 and 2), both men (p < 0.1) and 
women (p < 0.1) attribute it to ability. There is no significant gender difference in the attribution 
pattern.  
                                               
12 Since some participants in this analysis did not receive feedback at all, we say a participant receives potential 
positive feedback if she either receives positive feedback or would received positive feedback if she were to receive 
one. Similarly for potential negative feedback. 
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After receiving a surprising negative feedback (Columns 3 and 4), men attribute the 
negative surprise to luck, although the change is not significant. Women, on the other hand, 
attribute the negative outcome to their lack of ability (p < 0.01). The F-test at the bottom of the 
table shows that the change in attribution after receiving a negative surprise is significantly 
different for men and women (p < 0.01). 
After getting a reinforcing positive feedback, women ascribe it to luck, whereas men do 
not update their attribution compared to those who did not receive feedback. The gender 
difference in attribution is significant (p < 0.1). 
After getting a surprising positive feedback, both men and women ascribe it more to luck, 
although the change in not significant for either gender. 
To summarize, we find the following differential pattern of attribution of feedback to 
luck versus ability between men and women: 
1. Women attribute negative feedback to lack of ability, regardless of whether it is 
consistent with their self-evaluation.  
2. Men attribute negative feedback to bad lack when the feedback underlines their positive 
self-evaluation. They attribute negative feedback to lack of ability only when they hold a 
negative self-evaluation initially.  




Table 8. Gender Difference in Attribution of Feedback (including participants who did not receive feedback) 
Dependent variable: attribution 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
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R-squared 0.06 0.08   0.13 0.15   0.18 0.27   0.10 0.28 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Only Wave 1 and Wave 2 of our experiment included the attribution question. Therefore, this regression analysis is based on these 
two waves. The entire analysis shown in this table is restricted to participants who were assigned to the no feedback condition or 
the forced feedback condition. In negative reinforcement, we further restrict to participants who were not payment-confident and 
who would receive negative feedback confirming their belief. In negative surprise, we further restrict to participants who were 
payment-confident and who would receive negative feedback. In positive reinforcement, we further restrict to participants who 
were payment-confident and would receive positive feedback. In positive surprise, we further restrict to participants who were not 
payment-confident and who would receive positive feedback. F-test of interactions tests against the null hypothesis that 
maleXforced is equal to femaleXforced. 
 
4.5 Attribution as an explanatory variable for tournament entry 
 Our results document a gender gap in tournament entry when the opponent is not female 
and feedback is unavailable. We also observe a gender difference in attribution of feedback. 
Provided an unexpected negative feedback, women attribute it to their lack of ability, whereas 
men attribute it to bad luck. Our next goal is to address if the difference in attribution translates 
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into behavior and thus explains the gender gap in tournament entry. If attribution is a major 
explanatory variable for the gender gap in tournament entry, then we should expect to see that 
gender predicts tournament entry in a weaker manner conditional on the attribution of feedback 
than unconditionally.  
 In Table 9, we first verify a significant gender gap in tournament entry among 
participants who faced a male opponent or a gender-unknown opponent and who received no 
feedback (Column 1). Women are 18 percentage points less likely to enter competition than men. 
Since we want to use attribution as a control, we further restrict the sample to participants who 
answered the attribution question in Column 2, which provides a baseline level of the gender gap. 
The gender difference in tournament entry remains in Column 2 and, additionally, in Column 3, 
where we control for score in Section 1.  
In Column 4, we additionally control for attribution and its interaction with gender, since 
attribution may have different effect on tournament entry for men and women. Upon inclusion of 
attribution, the coefficient on female is not statistically different from zero. However, the 
magnitude remains economically meaningful. In Column 5, we further control for risk and 
payment-confidence, as well as their interactions with gender, allowing them to affect 
tournament entry differently for men and women. Now, the gender gap in competitiveness drops 
in magnitude to close to zero. The combined effect of risk, payment-confidence, and attribution 
seems to eliminate the predicative power of gender on tournament entry.  
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Table 9. Attribution as an Explanatory Variable for the Gender Gap in Competitiveness 
Dependent variable: tournament entry 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
          
 female -0.18** -0.27** -0.22* -0.23 -0.03 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.13) (0.26) (0.33) 
score in Section 1 
  
0.06* 0.04 0.04 
   
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
attribution 
   
0.003 0.004 
    
(0.003) (0.004) 
femaleXattribution 
   
0.00009 0.00007 
    
(0.004) (0.004) 
risk 
    
0.04 
     
(0.04) 
femaleXrisk 
    
-0.01 
     
(0.04) 
not payment-confident 
    
0.10 




    
-0.22 
     
(0.25) 
      Dependent variable 
mean 0.37 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Observations 148 71 71 71 71 
R-squared 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.19 
  Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
For all of the regressions, we restrict to participants who received no feedback, and who were 
not matched with a female opponent. For Columns 2 through 5, we further restrict to 
participants who were in Wave 1 and Wave 2, since only participants in these two waves 
answered the attribution question.  
 
However, we cannot determine which ones of the three factors explain the gender gap. 
Since the regression is restricted to the no feedback condition, feedback attribution, risk aversion, 
and payment-confidence are all endogenous variables that are not manipulated by treatment. 
Thus, we cannot disassociate the treatment effects of these variables and make valid inference 
about which variables are causally meaningful. 
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We further investigate if attribution is a channel through which feedback narrows the 
gender gap in tournament entry. We found that feedback influences attribution differently for 
men and women. We now examine whether the predicative power of women and feedback on 
tournament entry drop as we control for attribution. Table 10 presents the results. We again 
separate the analyses into two cases, based on participants’ payment-confidence. In Columns 1 
and 7, we estimate regressions similar to those in Table 7, but using tournament entry as the 
dependent variable, allowing gender and feedback both to affect tournament entry. We find that 
women who receive negative feedback, either as reinforcement or as surprise, are deterred from 
tournament entry. Recall from Table 7 that women who receive negative feedback tend to 
attribute it more to their own ability, regardless of whether the feedback is consistent with their 
initial self-evaluation. On the other hand, men’s tournament entry pattern generally does not 
change after they receive a negative feedback. The coefficient is significant for men in Column 7, 
but the significance soon drops once we control for score in Section 1. In Column 2, we 
condition on actual score of Section 1, and find that entry deterrence generally persists for 
women who receive reinforcing negative feedback. We do the same for participants who receive 
negative surprise in Column 8 and find that entry deterrence vanishes for men and significantly 
decreases for women, suggesting that actual performance is an explanatory factor.  
In Columns 3, 4, 5, we condition additionally on risk aversion and score-confidence for 
those who receive negative reinforcement. We fail to find evidence showing that these factors 
are the main channels through which gender and feedback predict entry. Similar results hold in 
Columns 9, 10, 11 for those who receive negative surprise.  
Finally, in Columns 6 and 12, we condition instead on attribution and its interaction with 
negative feedback, in order to account for the differential interpretations of attribution depending 
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on the direction of feedback. We note that the coefficient changes slightly in Column 6 but 
dramatically from negative to positive in Column 12. However, the standard errors increase 
substantially, potentially due to inefficiency of the OLS estimator because of the correlation 
between covariates. We lack statistical power to conclude definitively that attribution is a 
channel through which gender and feedback predict tournament entry.  
In short, we do not have conclusive evidence supporting attribution as a major 
explanatory variable of the gender gap in tournament entry. We conclude that: 
1. The combination of attribution, risk, and payment-confidence renders the gap statistically 
and economically insignificant, but we cannot discern the individual effect of the three 
variables.  
2. While we document strong gender differences in attribution of feedback, we are unable to 






Chapter 5. Conclusion 
Our findings are generally consistent with the findings of the literature in terms of gender 
gap in behavioral traits. We find large, significant gender differences in estimation of score, self-
evaluation of payment, and self-reported risk level, consistent with the literature. We also find 
substantial differences in competitiveness by gender among participants who were assigned to 
mixed-gender groups and received no feedback. Women are significantly less likely to enter 
competition, which is consistent with the findings by NV, despite the fact that our tournament is 
relatively less competitive than competition in NV and other previous work. Also consistent with 
previous literature, we find that the gender gap in tournament entry is eliminated when the 
participants receive feedback (Ertac and Szentes 2010) and when female participants are made 
aware that they would be facing a woman in competition (Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini 
2003). 
 We present two main findings. First, we observe that women efficiently self-select into 
tournament based on their performance, even if they have no information about their score or 
relative performance is provided. Men, on the other hand, blindly enter competition regardless of 
how they perform in the absence of feedback. Upon receiving feedback, men adjust their 
tournament entry pattern to the one that is more similar to women – both are more likely to enter 
as their performance increases. These results resemble the finding by Exley, Niederle, and 
Vesterlund (2016), who observed that women positively select into negotiations and know when 
to ask.  
Our second main finding contributes to a growing literature on gender differences and 
reactions to feedback, advancing a potential explanation for the gender difference in 
competitiveness. Previous work has mostly focused on the direct effect of feedback on decision 
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making, without exploring the channel. We, instead, focuses on the mechanism through which 
feedback influences competition entry. We hypothesize that attribution of feedback is the likely 
mechanism. We find a gender difference in attribution of feedback to luck versus ability. Women 
tend to blame ability for negative feedback and credit luck for positive feedback. Men blame 
ability if negative feedback confirms their self-evaluation but blame bad luck if surprised by 
negative feedback. They do not react to positive feedback substantially. Our results are largely 
consistent with our priors, and show that attribution of feedback has a substantial gender 
difference, which may potentially explain various outcome variables. 
 We believe this study provides23 opportunities for future work. In this paper, we 
attempted to explore the underlying reasons for the gender gap in tournament entry, but we did 
not obtain dispositive evidence. In future work, we plan to explore whether attribution explains 
tournament entry in a more competitive tournament, such as the winner-take-all tournament 
scheme in NV. Second, we focused on competitiveness in this study. In future work, we plan to 
study other outcome variables such as human capital investment since gender differences in 
attribution could affect investment. Third, we plan to compare our results to gender differences 
in the impact of feedback and attribution in a stereotypically female task. As noted above, the 
anagram task that we selected for this comparison was not suited for the online platform since 
participants could access online search engines.  
 There are obvious limitations to our experimental framework. First, the experimental 
setting often involves significant simplification compared to the real world, so the conclusions in 
this simple world might not hold when there are other factors influencing behavior. Second, the 
stakes involved in our experiment are low (around two dollars), and thus might not be 
generalized to high-stakes scenarios. Third, the participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk are 
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usually experienced survey takers. They may exhibit different decision-making traits than the 
average person.   
Despite these limitations, our results have certain implications. Our results on self-
selection into tournament show that women correctly sort into competition based on their 
performance even in the absence of feedback. This finding suggests that it is not always optimal 
to force women to enter competition, especially when the competition favors men in nature. Our 
results on feedback attribution highlight a significant disparity: Receiving the same signals about 
performance, women might not update their beliefs in the same way as men do. This observation 
has potentially important implications for the labor market: The best feedback for women should 
emphasize the importance of their ability. Moreover, we may expect attribution of feedback to 
play an important role in entry or decision-making in the financial markets. Unlucky female 
traders may misattribute losses to ability rather than luck and are thus deterred from risk-taking. 
Closing the gender gap in attribution could therefore help to eliminate the gap in investment 
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Appendix 1. Pilot Study and Full-length Experiment Design  
 
1. Pilot study 
We conducted two rounds of pilot study: 
  
In the first round, participants worked on three separate tasks, each for 5 minutes. The 
three tasks are Mental Rotation Test (MRT), Finding Median Task (FMT), and Matrix Pattern 
Task (MPT).13 Examples of these tasks are shown below.  
After each section of tasks, participants answered a few questions: 
1. Confidence perception: “How many questions do you think you solved correctly in 
this task?” 
2. Gender perception: “Do you think men or women are more likely to get a higher 
score in this task?” 
Participants were paid a piece rate payment based on how many questions they solved 
correctly in the three tasks.  
 
We collected 49 valid answers for the first round of pilot study. A Mann-Whitney U test 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that men and women performed identically in all three tasks (p 
= 0.1276 for MRT; p = 0.2580 for FMT; p = 0.3357 for MPT). In terms of gender perception 
associated with the test, only MRT is perceived to favor men (p = 0.0306 for MRT; p = 0.8881 
for FMT; p = 0.2017 for MPT). 
 
In the second round of pilot study, participants completed the MRT and MPT. FMT was 
dropped in this round of pilot because it does not seem to be associated with any gender 
perception. Participants answered the same confidence and gender perception questions. The 
only difference is that they were paid by a tournament-based payment scheme that is the same as 
in the main study. In particular, we say: 
“We previously ran this test on a similar group and got the performance. We will 
randomly pair you with a participant from that group. Your payment will be as follows: 
1. If your total score is higher than your random match’s, you get 20 cents for 
each correct answer. 
2. If your total score is lower than your random match’s, you get 15 cents for 
each correct answer.” 
Their score was compared to the score of a randomly chosen participant from the first round of 
pilot, and their payment was calculated as stated above.  
 
We collected 50 valid answers for the second round of pilot study. In terms of 
performance, men scored higher than women in MPT (p = 0.0657). The performance is similar 
across gender in MRT (p = 0.3983). Neither task was associated with a strong gender perception 
(p = 0.4016 for MPT; p = 0.3319 for MRT). A summary table is shown below. Taken together, 
MRT is perceived as favoring male and does not elicit gender gap in performance; therefore, we 
decided to use MRT for our main experiment.  
  
                                               
13 The version of MRT adopted in our experiment is modified on Peters and Battista (2008)’s Mental Rotation 
Stimulus Library. The MPT adopted in our experiment is a selection of an online test by Richler, Wilmer, and 
Gauthier (2017). Both tests are provided to us by Prof. Jeremy Wilmer.  
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Select the shape that is a rotated version of the one above: 
Round 1: Piece rate Payment 
 Difference in Performance Difference in Perception 
MRT N Y 
FMT N N 
MPT N N 
Round 2: Tournament Payment 
 Difference in Performance Difference in Perception 
MRT N N 


























In each problem, you will see a sequence of shapes. Your job is to fill in the 
question mark with a shape from the choices.  
 
Select the median of these 9 numbers. 
 
 




















Sample Matrix Pattern Test (MPT) question:  
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2. Full-length experimental design:  
Round 1:  
1. Participants compete a 2.5-minute MRT 
2. Confidence evaluation: “How many problems do you think you solved correctly?”  
3. Payment information: 
“We previously ran this test on a similar group and got the performance. We will 
randomly pair you with a participant from that group. Your payment will be as follows: 
• If your total score is higher than your random match’s, you get 20 cents for each 
correct answer. 
• If your total score is lower than your random match’s, you get 15 cents for each 
correct answer.” 
4. Participants learn their payment. Participants are randomly assigned into two conditions 
in this step: 
a. Gender-unknown condition 
“Our matching process has randomly matched you with a participant from the 
other group. Your score has been compared with his/hers, and your payment is 
shown below.” 
b. Gendered condition 
“Our matching process has randomly matched you with a male participant from 
the other group. Your score has been compared with his, and your payment is 
shown below.” 
OR  
“Our matching process has randomly matched you with a female participant from 
the other group. Your score has been compared with hers, and your payment is 
shown below.” 
5. Self-evaluation: “Do you think it’s an above average payment or below average 
payment?”  
6. Participants are randomly assigned into one of the three feedback conditions: 
a. No Feedback condition 
i. Participants assign relative importance to luck and ability.  
b. Forced feedback condition 
i. Participants learn whether their payment is above or below average: 
“We compared your payment to the average payment of the other group. 
Your payment is above (below) the average.” 
ii. Then they assign relative importance to luck and ability. 
c. Optional feedback condition 
i. Participants have an opportunity to choose whether they want feedback 
about whether their payment is above or below average: 
“Now you have an opportunity to find out if your payment is above the 
average payment of the other group. The knowledge of your relative 
payment will inform your decision in the next round and influence your 
payment.  
Please select the maximum amount you are willing to pay to receive this 
information. Please note that, if you select a certain amount, we 
automatically assume you are willing to pay any price that is lower than 
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your selection. For example, if you select 10 cents, we automatically 
assume that you are also willing to pay 5 cents.  
Then, we will randomly draw a price from these five options. If this price 
is less than or equal to your maximum, then the price will be subtracted 
from your payment, and you will receive information about your relative 
payment. On the other hand, if this price is greater than your maximum, 
then you will not get any information, and your payment will be unaffected.  
 
Please note that, in a rare instance, your price of information may be 
greater than your final bonus payment, in which case, the difference will 
be deducted from your base payment. 
• 5 cents 
• 10 cents 
• 15 cents 
• 20 cents 
• 25 cents" 
ii. Then we randomly draw one of the amount. If one indicates that she 
would be willing to pay that amount, she will pay it and receive the 
feedback information. If one indicates that she would not be willing to pay 
that amount, she will not pay any money and will not receive any 
information. 
iii. Finally, participants assign relative importance to luck and ability 
 
Round 2 
1. Participants choose which payment scheme they want to use for the second round: 
i. Option 1: We randomly pair you with another participant from the other 
group. I 
• If your total score is higher than your randomly chosen match’s, 
you get 25 cents for each correct answer.  
• If your total score is lower than your randomly chosen match’s, 
you get 10 cents for each correct answer. 
ii. Option 2: You get 17.5 cents for each correct answer, regardless of 
anyone else’s score. 
2. Participants complete a 2.5-minute test. They payment is calculated based on the payment 
scheme they choose. 




Please rank from 1-10 how you see yourself:  
Are you generally a person who avoid taking risks or are you fully prepared to take risks? 
(1 is unwilling to take risks and 10 is fully prepared to take risks) 
 





What is your gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other/Do not wish to disclose 
What is your age in years? 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. Less than high school 
b. High school or GED 
c. Some college 
d. 2-year college degree (Associates) 
e. 4-year college degree (BA, BS) 
f. Master’s degree (MA, MS) 
g. Doctoral degree (PhD) 
h. Professional degree (MD, JD, DDS, etc.) 




Which of the following best describes your race? 
a. White 
b. African-American or Black 
c. Asian 
d. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
e. Native American 
f. Other/Do not wish to disclose 
Which of the following best describes your annual household income before taxes? 
a. Less than $10,000 
b. $10,000 - $19,999 
c. $20,000 - $29,999 
d. $30,000 - $39,999 
e. $40,000 - $49,999 
f. $50,000 - $74,999 
g. $75,000 - $99,999 
h. $100,000 - $149,999 
i. $150,000 - $249,999 
j. $250,000-$499,999 
k. $500,000 and over 
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Appendix 2. Analysis of Wave 1 
 
In this wave, participants completed the full-length experiment. Our analysis is based on 307 



























Appendix 3. Analysis of Wave 2 
 
In this wave, we corrected the mistake made in wave 1 and included only the forced feedback 












Appendix 4. Analysis of Wave 3 
 
 In this wave, participants completed the full-length experiment. Our analysis is based on 198 







Appendix 5. Robustness Check  
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